Crisis of Command: How We Lost Trust and Confidence in America's Generals and Politicians
Book by Stuart Scheller
DETAILS
Publisher : Knox Press (September 6, 2022) Language : English Hardcover : 272 pages ISBN-10 : 1637585446 ISBN-13 : 978-1637585443 Item Weight : 15.7 ounces Dimensions : 6 x 1 x 9 inches Best Sellers Rank: #17,574 in Books (See Top 100 in Books) #3 in Military Policy (Books) #9 in Afghan War Biographies #12 in Afghan War Military History , Wall Street Journal Bestseller USA Today Bestseller Publishers Weekly Bestseller As Seen on Tucker Carlson Combat-decorated Marine officer Stuart Scheller speaks out against the debacle of the Afghan pullout as the culmination of a decades-long and still-ongoing betrayal of military members by top leadership, from generals to the commander in chief, comes to light. Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Scheller was the perfect Marine. Battle tested. A leader. Decorated for valor. Yet when the United States acted like the Keystone Cops in a panicked haphazard exit from Afghanistan for political reasons, Scheller spoke out, and the generals lashed out. In fact, they jailed him to keep him quiet, claiming he lost the “trust and confidence” bestowed upon him by the Marines. When the faith and trust is exactly what our generals and even our commander-in-chief betrayed by exercising such reckless and derelict policies. Now Scheller is free from the shackles of the Marine Corps and can speak his mind. And in Crisis of Command , that he does. He holds our generals’ feet to the fire. The same generals who play frivolously with the lives of our service men and women for political gain. The same general who lied to political leaders to further their own agendas and careers. Stuart Scheller is here to say that the buck stops here. Accountability starts now. It’s time to demand accountability and stand up for our military. In this book, Stuart Scheller shows us how. Read more
REVIEW
I was pleased to hear of the release of Scheller’s memoirs and immediately ordered the book. I expected to find a work with which I had a lot in common, including three and a half years of command as an infantry officer in the army (a generation earlier!). I was appalled at the poorly managed evacuation in Afghanistan, so I agreed with the televised version of his plea for accountability from our senior leadership. I thought his pre-trial confinement was an outrage (I had a soldier who was repeatedly raping his 8 and 11 year old step-daughters whom our JAG officers would not order pre-trail confinement). I sent money to the Pipe Hitters, wrote my Congressional representative to express my concern for the confinement given my understanding and experience with these matters—for which I received a slate of Democrat Party talking points, and wrote the Secretary of the Navy to urge his upgrading the court’s decision to give Scheller a general discharge. So I must confess to being a bit disappointed when I read the book. First, since I don’t have any social media accounts, I was not familiar with the continuing tirade of Scheller’s media postings. After reading this material, I got the impression that Scheller originally expected to be relieved of command but did not expect to see his career come to immediate termination. The subsequent postings reminded me of an angry person responding to actions he did not expect—he could use the advice of when you are in a hole, stop digging. He continued to dig, and the command eventually moved to court martial. Second, I was disappointed that he did not have a prior discussion with his wife before posting a video that he knew would severely impact his family’s life. Any career officer knows that his spouse and children make tremendous sacrifices during continuous moves and deployments. Third, Scheller makes references to historical decisions to reinforce his arguments when his own arguments are frequently weak. Specifically, he makes a critical (and superficial) evaluation of the Schlieffen Plan without any mention of the disintegration of Germany’s only reliable ally, Austria-Hungary, and the perceived imbalance Slavic nationalism was creating in the Habsburg monarchy. He also faults the Verdun operation without any reference or understanding of Falkenhayn’s rationale for launching this attack. In general, I don’t see in Scheller’s book any depth of historical understanding that I think he believes he has. Scheller does raise several important issues. First, how do we select general officers who can win our wars? Scheller infers a relationship between tactical performance and selection of strategic leader. History provides numerous examples of great small unit fighters who are not good strategic leaders; and there are many who have a real grasp of strategy that have had no formal strategic training. I think our military operations in Iraq in 1991 and 2003 demonstrated that our senior leaders have a good grasp of conventional operations. Obviously we have had problems in unconventional operations, but here we are not alone. The senior leaders, primarily trained to defeat our principal threats, have not shown a facile transition to insurgency operations. Here, they do deserve fault. The best work I have seen on this issue has been the Army War College’s publication of the Army’s efforts in Iraq from 2003 to evacuation. This extensive, 1400 page work demonstrates the frustrations our military had in Iraq, and it confirms many of Scheller’s frustrations. For example, the colonels who created and demonstrated effective responses outside the conventional approaches were not promoted, while those who followed the line were. And the only strategic winners of our efforts were the Iranian leaders. Picking the right leader is hard, and criteria difficult to establish. For example, in today’s environment, Eisenhower would not have been selected to lead the allied effort in Europe because he did not have combat service in World War I. However, when Scheller mentions that our procedures will never create a Napoleon, I think that is a good thing, since Napoleon used the military to establish an authoritarian regime that cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of his soldiers (not just to combat, but due to neglect of pay, food, and other essentials), and in the end, left France a smaller and poorer nation than when he seized power. Second Scheller exposes an important issue of how to respond to the individual soldier’s ability to reach the world through social media. I am glad that this is not my issue to resolve, since I swore to uphold the Constitution, guaranteeing freedom of speech, and how this right is balanced with military discipline. Scheller is very pessimistic about the senior leadership’s ability to change and improve our military capabilities. After our Vietnam failure, I found our senior leadership was able to change the Army. The Army developed new doctrine, fielded the equipment that would enable this doctrine, improved joint operations with the Air Force, dramatically improved discipline in the junior enlisted ranks with mandatory and random drug testing, and raised the professional standards of the senior Non-Commissioned officers and junior and field grade officers. The payoff of this change was the very creditable victory in Iraq in 1991. Can we achieve such reforms again? An average of 22 veterans a day committing suicide—a sure indication that something is drastically wrong. Is the senior leadership able to make the necessary changes to improve from private through 4-star flag officer; can we overhaul our procurement system to field the equipment we need for anticipated future conflict; can we manage to coordinate our presidential and diplomatic strategy with our military operations to achieve national goals? Resolution of these problems remains in the air. But I cannot endorse Scheller’s often cited action of “throwing his rank on the table” to change course. First, no single resignation will accomplish anything—there will always be a willing replacement. Second, general officers’ resignation does not have to be accepted by the President. He can retain the general officer in the service and court martial him. And again, there will always be a willing replacement. Third, Scheller should ask what would be consequences of massive resignations in the face of questionable orders. Historically, we would consider such action mutiny. Scheller would have no book and no impact had he not released his rank throwing on a video posted with a global access. He may have had the best of intentions, and since he was the only officer to take this course of action he was able to garner a lot of (financial) support, and his action has forced a small number of Americans to consider the issues his decision brought to the surface. But in the end, a year after the debacle in America, our senior military leadership has not changed course, and the issues Scheller has raised remain unresolved.
DOWNLOAD PAGE
https://omegamedialoc.exblog.jp/32603915/
https://pangestu.pixnet.net/blog/post/78750238-%5bdownload%5d-we-were-liars-%28book%29
留言列表
